Cournot competition in spatial markets: some complementary results on complementarity by Cosnita, Andreea
Cournot competition in spatial markets : some
complementary results on complementarity
Andreea Cosnita
To cite this version:
Andreea Cosnita. Cournot competition in spatial markets : some complementary results on
complementarity. Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques 2005.61 - ISSN : 1624-0340.
2005. <halshs-00196099>
HAL Id: halshs-00196099
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00196099
Submitted on 12 Dec 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/Publicat.htm
ISSN : 1624-0340
Equipe Universitaire de Recherche
en Economie Quantitative - UMR 8594
       
Cournot competition in spatial markets :
some complementary results on complementarity
Andreea COSNITA, EUREQua
2005.61
Cournot Competition in Spatial Markets:
some complementary results on complementarity
Andreea Cosnita∗
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne†
University of Paris I
April 27, 2006
∗cosnita@univ-paris1.fr
†Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647 PARIS cedex 13, FRANCE
1
Abstract
We study in this paper location equilibria for a symmetrical two-store duopoly selling complementary
varieties, both on the linear and the circular markets. In contrast to the existing literature, besides
assuming that each aﬃliate produces a diﬀerent complementary variety, we equally consider in turns
complementarity among all varieties on the market and substitutability between rival varieties. On the
segment market, the intuition of a single-plant entity behaviour is enough to obtain and justify the result
of central agglomeration. On the circle, instead, we are able to check the multiple equilibria property,
to the extent that besides the intuitive spatial pattern, we identified each time a second one, involving
diametrical dispersion, viable though only for low degrees of complementarity.
Keywords: complementary products, multi-store competition, spatial Cournot model;
JEL: D43, L13, R32
Résumé
Cet article étudie le choix de localisation dans un modèle d’oligopole de Cournot où les firmes
produisent des biens complémentaires. Pour la première fois dans la littérature, on fait l’hypothèse
que chaque filiale produit des varietés distinctes. On analyse les implications spatiale d’un tel cadre
(correspondant par exemple à des firmes produisant des biens-système) en considérant les cas de la
complémentarité entre varietés rivales et puis de la substituabilité. L’agglomération totale est toujours
un équilibre pour la ville linéaire, ce qui est bien intuitive suivant notre hypothèse de complémentarité
intra-firme. Néanmoins, pour la ville circulaire, en plus de l’équilibre intuitif impliquant l’agglomération
des propres filiales, on démontre à chaque fois l’existence d’un deuxième équilibre, qui exige la dispersion
diamétrale des firmes. Ceci montre la robustesse de la multiplicité d’équilibres de localisation dans le
cadre circulaire.
1. Introduction
The earliest contributions to the spatial competition topic endogenized location choice for
single-store firms selling a homogenous product and competing in prices. It turned out that the
location-price model cannot sustain spatial agglomeration, either on the linear (see d’Aspremont
et al. (79)) or the circular (see Kats (1995)) markets. Later, models studying location choice
for Cournot rivals proved that the intensity of competition was determinant for this result.
Anderson and Neven (1991) and Hamilton et al. (1989) established thus the central agglomer-
ation on the segment. More recently, Pal (1998), Matsushima (2001) and Gupta et al. (2004)
showed in turn that the shape of the market was equally important for the location outcome,
since Cournot competitors cannot completely agglomerate on the circular market, but instead
disperse, although they may cluster at several distinct locations.
Given the appealing properties of the Cournot spatial models1, such as overlapping firm
areas or agglomeration at discrete points, several papers have soon modified various assumptions
of the initial framework2. Pal and Sarkar (2002) proved that competition among multi-store
firms yields clustering of diﬀerent firms’ outlets on the segment3. Shimizu (2002) relaxed the
product homogeneity assumption in a single-outlet duopoly framework and confirmed the central
agglomeration result on the segment, but showed that the outcome on the circle depends on
whether goods are complements or substitutes. Yu and Lai (2003) extended the analysis to a
1Cournot shipping models can apply both on the production and the consumption side. Choosing locations
approximates for firms the mechanism of flexible manufacturing, where the basic product (standing for the
location of the firm) is then customized at a certain cost (here, the shipping cost) so as to make it available
to consumers. At the same time, a set of consumers with preferences defined on a set of goods can normally
be represented by such a location model, which actually was in the beginning the very purpose of the analogy
between the spatial setting and the product diﬀerentiation framework.
2 In addition of the articles we quote next, see also Mayer (2000) and Matsumura et al. (2005) for contributions
dealing with the properties of the production or transport cost functions in spatial markets.
3The complexity of the model has prevented yet adressing the parallel outcome for the circular market -
Chamorro-Rivas (2000) and Cosnita (2005) have nevertheless established results for particular cases.
two-store duopoly, and found that on the circle firms agglomerate but stores disperse when rival
products are complementary and own products are substitutes.
We acknowledge Yu and Lai’s 2003 article as the starting point of our analysis, since we
further explore the implications of the product complementarity assumption for the location
equilibrium pattern of a spatial oligopoly. We consider in turns the following two frameworks:
first of all, the case of complementarity among all varieties on the market, which is at the same
time an "extreme" extension of Yu and Lai’s complementarity assumption, but also the com-
plete reversal of the usual hypothesis of homogenous product in the spatial Cournot literature.
Secondly, we tackle the opposite of Yu and Lai’s framework, meaning we consider the case of an
oligopoly characterized by intra-firm complementarity4 but inter-firm substitutability5. These
two diﬀerent settings allow us to alter one particular hypothesis which has not been yet formally
analyzed in Cournot shipping models, namely the one variety per firm assumption. To facilitate
the comparison with previous theoretical contributions, we stick with the multi-store symmetric
duopoly framework, and also deal with both the linear and circular markets.
In the first case, we confirm the intuition that complementarity between all varieties induces
total agglomeration both on the segment and the circle. However, on the latter we equally
identify an equilibrium pattern of intra-firm agglomeration and equidistant firm dispersion that
is sustainable for low product complementarity. In the second case, by assuming instead that
rival products are perfect substitutes, we still obtain complete central agglomeration on the linear
market, as well as multiple equilibria on the circular one. We show that on the circle, spatial
4Assuming intra-firm complementarity is realistic to the extent that real-life firms often produce simultaneously
complementary goods, such as brick and cement, or operating systems and internet navigators. Moreover, intra-
firm complementarity is the natural outcome of any conglomerate merger.
5The same setting of aﬃliates producing complementary goods, and rival stores producing subtitutes was
retained by Tan and Yuan (2003) to examine the incentives to divisionalize of rival conglomerate firms, competing
though in prices and in a non-spatial market.
Cournot competition between two-store firms producing substitutable system goods exhibits
both intra-firm agglomeration with equidistant firm dispersion, but also inter-firm clustering
with intra-firm diametrical dispersion.
The main findings of our paper are the following. On the one hand, we are able to extend the
multiple equilibria property of the circular market to the case of multi-store competition with
intra-firm complementarity, regardless of the assumption on inter-firm competition (i.e. substi-
tutability or complementarity). This allows us to conclude that dealing with complementarity
between own varieties can be tricky in a circular Cournot setting. Yu and Lai’s bottom line idea
was that intra-firm complementarity basically induces multi-plant firms to act as single-store
ones6, and we confirm that this intuition is suﬃcient on the linear market. We show here in turn
that directly assuming single-plant behaviour leaves out on the circle viable alternative equi-
librium patterns for certain degrees of complementarity. Incidentally, this stresses that results
obtained for single-plant competition do not necessarily extend to multi-plant settings.
On the other hand, we remind the relevance of assumptions on plant-level (rather than firm-
level) competition, since the partial dispersion outcome with intra-firm agglomeration is entirely
due to our hypothesis of intra-firm complementarity. Actually, we obtain the opposite result of
Yu and Lai (2003) for the two-plant duopoly by making the contrary assumption on intra-firm
competition, although their result and one of the patterns we identify are identical from the
point of view of the spatial distribution of varieties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and presents
the complete complementarity case, whereas section 3 deals with the intra-firm complementarity,
6This is due to the strategic agglomeration eﬀect of intra-firm complementarity, which has each aﬃliate sell
more at the other aﬃliate’s location.
inter-firm substitutability case. Both the segment and the circle markets are studied under stan-
dard linearity assumptions on cost and demand functions, which are used throughout the paper.
Profits’ expressions, as well as First Order Conditions (FOCs) and Second Order Conditions
(SOCs) are generally extremely complex and space-consuming, therefore more often than not
they shall be omitted for brevity7. Section 4 concludes by summarizing results and comparing
them with those available so far in the literature.
2. Complete Complementarity
Let there be two firms competing in quantities on the unit market (be it linear or circular).
Each firm owns two stores and each store delivers only one good. Assume that all goods are
symmetrically complementary among them. Individual market demands at any location x are
linear and symmetric, and since each plant sells a diﬀerent product, the inverse demand will
typically be given by: Pi (x) = a− qi (x)+ bqj (x)+ bqk (x)+ bqh (x), where i, j, k, h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
and i 6= j 6= k 6= h with a, b > 0 and independent of x. Consumers are uniformly distributed
along the unitary perimeter of the market and consume all products.
We assume that each good is produced with the same technology exhibiting constant marginal
costs, normalized to zero. Each firm incurs the same linear transport cost to ship the product
to consumers’ locations: t |x− z|, where z is the location from which the product is shipped8.
To keep things simple, let t = 1, or equivalently, let a be the transport-cost adjusted reservation
price. Consumers have a prohibitive transport cost, preventing arbitrage, therefore firms can and
7A Technical Appendix containing them as well as all relevant computation is of course available on request
from the author.
8 In the case of the circular maket, the norm stands for the shorter distance of the two possible ways to ship
goods along the circumference.
will price discriminate across the set of spatially diﬀerentiated markets. Given constant marginal
delivery costs, a set of independent Cournot equilibria obtains for each location x. There are no
set-up or location costs. The game we consider is two-stage, firms choosing locations first and
then competing in quantities. The backwards induction will be used to find the SPNE.
Regardless of the shape of the market, one can compute the equilibrium quantities supplied
at each market point by each firm at the second stage. Let the first firm (denoted "12”) sell
goods 1 and 2, and the second firm (denoted "34”) sell goods 3 and 4. Firms’ profits at each
market point x write



Π12(x) = (P1(x)− c1(x)) · q1(x) + (P2(x)− c2(x)) · q2(x)
Π34(x) = (P3(x)− c3(x)) · q3(x) + (P4(x)− c4(x)) · q4(x)
where ci (x) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 stands for the constant marginal delivery cost of product i to location
x. Solving the simultaneous system of FOCs gives the equilibrium quantities supplied at each
market point:



q∗1(x) =
1
4b+8b2−4
¡
2c1 − 2ab− 2a− 2bc1 + 2bc2 + bc3 + bc4 − b2c1 − b2c2 + b2c3 + b2c4
¢
q∗2(x) =
1
4b+8b2−4
¡
2c2 − 2ab− 2a+ 2bc1 − 2bc2 + bc3 + bc4 − b2c1 − b2c2 + b2c3 + b2c4
¢
q∗3(x) =
1
4b+8b2−4
¡
2c3 − 2ab− 2a+ bc1 + bc2 − 2bc3 + 2bc4 + b2c1 + b2c2 − b2c3 − b2c4
¢
q∗4(x) =
1
4b+8b2−4
¡
2c4 − 2ab− 2a+ bc1 + bc2 + 2bc3 − 2bc4 + b2c1 + b2c2 − b2c3 − b2c4
¢
To ensure positive quantities for each store throughout the market, let a > 2 and b < 0.5.
At the first stage, in order to optimally locate their outlets, the duopolists maximize their
overall profits with respect to store locations denoted p1 and p2, and r1 and r2 respectively:
maxp1,p2 Π12(p1, p2; r1, r2;x) = maxp1,p2
³R 1
0
(q∗1(p1, p2; r1, r2;x))
2
dx+
R 1
0
(q∗2(p1, p2; r1, r2;x))
2
dx
´
and
maxr1,r2 Π34(r1, r2; p1, p2;x) = maxr1,r2
³R 1
0
(q∗3(r1, r2; p1, p2;x))
2
dx+
R 1
0
(q∗4(r1, r2; p1, p2;x))
2
dx
´
.
2.1. The linear market
We begin our discussion by directly giving the outcome of the game on the linear market.
Result 1: The only spatial equilibrium for a two-store duopoly characterized by intra- and
inter-firm complementarity competing in quantities on the linear market is total central agglom-
eration.
The intuition for the above result is actually enough to prove it. Because of the transport
cost linearity, each outlet sells the most at its own location but less and less as the delivery
location is farther away. Thus, minimizing transport costs induces each outlet to choose the
central location, and therefore they cluster9. In addition, this agglomeration eﬀect due to the
existence of market borders is enhanced by the strategic eﬀect due to product complementarity
(and it is straightforward to check that here Best Reply functions are upward sloping). Intra-firm
complementarity means it is optimal to match a higher quantity of the other aﬃliate by a higher
quantity of its own, so the best two stores owned by the same firm can do is to share the same
location10. By the same token, inter-firm complementarity gives firms incentive to agglomerate.
To sum up, on the linear market the three agglomeration forces enhance one another, making
all stores cluster at the market center.
9Basically, this is the "natural location" eﬀect of the linear market, where cost-minimization always gives
incentives towards the unique most preferred location, the mid-segment point.
10This cannot be the case with product substitutability, because downward sloping Best Replies push outlets
to disperse and to serve distinct half-markets, so as to lessen intra-firm competition.
Before addressing the circular case, we make one final remark for the linear one. Although
the system of FOCs is hard to solve explicitly, we can nevertheless venture to say that total
agglomeration is the unique equilibrium pattern. For that, it is enough to realize that on the
linear market there is no strategic eﬀect whatsoever that may generate dispersion. Both cost-
minimization and strategic complementarity give incentives to cluster at the most-preferred
location, the market center, without any countervailing force.
Corollary: In a model with complete complementarity (both at plant and firm level), total
central agglomeration is the only equilibrium for a location - Cournot game on the linear market,
regardless of the number of firms or plants.
2.2. The circular market
Turning now to the circle market, one needs to realize that depending on the relative position
of the diﬀerent stores, several cases are to be discussed in order to determine the location
equilibrium. Indeed, given the intra-firm complementarity assumption, one cannot assume that
each firm will locate its two stores within distinct disjoint half-circles, as is typically done when
own products are substitutes11 . The following cases were discussed12:
11With homogenous products, to minimize transport costs firms supply to each location from the closest store
only.
12The corresponding detailed computations are presented in the Technical Appendix available on request.



case 1 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ p2 + 1/2 ≤ r1 + 1/2 ≤ r2 + 1/2 ≤ 1
case 2 : 0 ≤ r1 − 1/2 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ r2 − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ r1 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ p2 + 1/2 ≤ r2 ≤ 1
case 3 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ r1 − 1/2 ≤ r2 − 1/2 ≤ p2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ p2 + 1/2 ≤ 1
case 4 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ r1 ≤ p2 − 1/2 ≤ r2 − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ r1 + 1/2 ≤ p2 ≤ r2 ≤ 1
Analytical explicit solutions could not be obtained, due to the complexity of the FOCs’
system, but we were able to identify each time one equilibrium pattern. For instance, cases 1
and 4 confirm the intuition of total agglomeration of stores. Indeed, this is merely the extension
of Yu and Lai’s result, since intra-firm complementarity induces own stores to cluster, and
therefore firms cluster too, because they behave as single-plant entities.
In turn, cases 2 and 3 yield the interesting and rather unexpected outcome of intra-firm
agglomeration but inter-firm diametrical dispersion, i.e. (p∗1 = 0, p
∗
2 = 0, r
∗
1 = 1/2, r
∗
2 = 1/2),
but only if product complementarity is low enough (i.e. b < 0.275). This allows us to give the
following:
Result 2: On the circular market, a two-store duopoly producing symmetrically comple-
mentary varieties and competing in quantities will exhibit total agglomeration of stores, but also
partial agglomeration with equal distance dispersion. In the latter case, each firm will locate
both outlets at the opposite ends of a diameter, provided that varieties be not too complementary
( b < 0.275).
Generally speaking, in spatial models with location choice it has long been established that
the FOCs simply translate what is called the quantity median property, i.e. total quantity sold
by the production plant to the left of its location needs to equal that to the right, if this location
is to be optimal. The crucial diﬀerence between the linear and the circular frameworks is that
on the segment, a firm’s quantity median is unique, whereas on the circle it is not. Actually, for
given competitors’ locations, if a point µ on the circle satisfies the quantity median property for
a firm, it is straightforward to see that the diametrically opposite location µ+ 1/2 does it too.
As already mentioned, as long as one assumes that firms behave as single-unit, due to inter-
firm complementarity, the total agglomeration result cannot be surprising. It is straightforward
to see that sharing the same location is a pattern that necessarily satisfies the quantity median
property for every firm. However, in the circular market, partial agglomeration with diametrical
dispersion is another such pattern. In our framework with perfectly symmetric complemen-
tarity, both patterns survive the final test of the SOCs, although not for the same degree of
complementarity.
Indeed, we are left to question why this diametrical pattern involves inter-firm dispersion, and
especially why this is no longer possible for the whole range of the complementarity parameter.
The answer is provided by the Best Reply functions. At plant level, it is straightforward to notice
that own output increases more with the other aﬃliate’s output than with the quantity of a rival
outlet: for instance, BR1 = a−c12 + bq2+
b
2q3+
b
2q4. At this point, it is clear that a firm’s outlet
values more the intra-firm complementarity than the inter-firm one. Nevertheless, it should be
obvious that the latter can only be neglected for quite low values of b, since overlooking this
supplementary agglomeration force lowers the total maximum profit of the firm13. This can
13 It is traightforward to check that intra-firm agglomeration with inter-firm dispersion is only a local maximum
(outlet profit of 1
48
(2b− 1)−2
?
12a2 − b− 6a+ b2 + 1
?
), as compared with total agglomeration, which is the
global maximum (individual outlet profit of 1
48
(2b− 1)−2
?
12a2 − 6a+ 1
?
).
The fact that this two equilibrium patterns are not equivalent in terms of firms’ profits is due on the one
hand to the homogeneity of the circular space (in contrast, the market border eﬀect on the segment makes
also be seen at firm level, by considering a firm’s aggregate Best Reply: BR12 = a−
c1+c2
2
1−b +
b
1−b (q3 + q4). Inter-firm complementarity can be neglected only if this complementarity is not
too strong (b < 0.27), since the coeﬃcient b1−b is increasing with b, so can only be approximated
with 0 for low enough values of b.
We go on next to look into the case of complementarity between own varieties and substi-
tutability between rival ones, so as to further explore the implications of the intra-firm comple-
mentarity assumption.
3. Intra-firm Complementarity with Inter—firm Substitutability
In this section, we deal with the opposite framework to that considered by Yu and Lai (2003).
More precisely, instead of considering two complementary varieties produced each by one rival
firm in its own two stores, we assume instead that firms produce two substitutable system goods,
meaning that a firm’s own plants produce complementary products, and that the firm’s couple of
varieties is substitute for the rival’s ones. Keeping the same linearity assumptions and notations
as before, let firm "12" ship varieties 1 and 2, complements, and let firm "34" ship products
3 and 4, also complements. However, the couples 1 and 3, and 2 and 4 are perfect substitutes
respectively. Therefore, the system of linear market demands is the following:



P13(x) = a− (q1(x) + q3(x)) + b(q2(x) + q4(x))
P24(x) = a− (q2(x) + q4(x)) + b(q1(x) + q3(x))
profit functions be single-peaked). On the other hand, total agglomeration naturally allows for higher profits in
equilibrium thanks to the maximum impact of the symmetric complementarity assumption. The parallel outcome
is obtained in the case of perfect product homogeneity for a triopoly on the circular market - total equidistant
dispersion gives higher equilibrium profits than diametrical dispersion with partial clustering - see Cosnita (2005).
At the second stage of the game, firms’ profits at each market point x write now



Π12(x) = (P13(x)− c1(x)) · q1(x) + (P24(x)− c2(x)) · q2(x)
Π34(x) = (P13(x)− c3(x)) · q3(x) + (P24(x)− c4(x)) · q4(x)
where ci (x) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 stands for the constant marginal delivery cost of product i to location
x. Solving the simultaneous system of FOCs gives the equilibrium quantities supplied at each
market point:



q∗1(x) =
1
3b2−3 (2c1 − ab− a− c3 + 2bc2 − bc4)
q∗2(x) =
1
3b2−3 (2c2 − ab− a− c4 + 2bc1 − bc3)
q∗3(x) =
1
3b2−3 (2c3 − ab− c1 − a− bc2 + 2bc4)
q∗4(x) =
1
3b2−3 (2c4 − ab− c2 − a− bc1 + 2bc3)
where a > 2 and b ∈ (0, 1) to ensure positive quantities throughout the market.
As before, at the first stage, to optimally locate their outlets, the duopolists maximize their
overall profits with respect to store locations denoted p1 and p2, and r1 and r2 respectively:
maxp1,p2 Π12(p1, p2; r1, r2;x) = maxp1,p2
³R 1
0
(q∗1(p1, p2; r1, r2;x))
2
dx+
R 1
0
(q∗2(p1, p2; r1, r2;x))
2
dx
´
and
maxr1,r2 Π34(r1, r2; p1, p2;x) = maxr1,r2
³R 1
0
(q∗3(r1, r2; p1, p2;x))
2
dx+
R 1
0
(q∗4(r1, r2; p1, p2;x))
2
dx
´
.
3.1. The linear market
Not being able to postulate directly that aﬃliates necessarily locate within distinct-half-
markets, we discussed the following three cases, depending on the relative position of stores:



case 1 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1
case 2 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ r1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ r2 ≤ p2 ≤ 1
case 3 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ r1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p2 ≤ r2 ≤ 1
Explicit analytical solutions were not available, but each time central total agglomeration at
(12 ;
1
2 ;
1
2 ;
1
2) was obtained as the location equilibrium, which should not come as a surprise.
Result 3: A symmetric two-plant duopoly selling substitutable system goods and competing
in quantities locates all stores at the center of the linear market.
Given that complementarity within each firm makes aﬃliate share the same location, one is
left with the easy problem of determining the spatial equilibrium for a duopoly selling substi-
tutes on the linear market - the answer has long been provided by Anderson and Neven (1991),
and is obviously central agglomeration. In other words, the intra-firm competition (comple-
mentarity) enhances the cost minimizing agglomeration eﬀect which has firms on the segment
take up the central location, despite the dispersion force generated by the inter-firm competition
(substitutability).
Next we analyze the circular market, which is basically a "neutral" framework to the extent
that it is free from any intrinsic agglomeration force.
3.2. The circular market
As expected, we start by a short14 list of cases discussed, such as:



case 1 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ p2 + 1/2 ≤ r1 + 1/2 ≤ r2 + 1/2 ≤ 1
case 2 : 0 ≤ r1 − 1/2 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ r2 − 1/2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ r1 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ p2 + 1/2 ≤ r2 ≤ 1
case 3 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 − 1/2 ≤ r2 − 1/2 ≤ r1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ p2 ≤ r2 ≤ r1 + 1/2 ≤ 1
case 4 : 0 ≤ p1 ≤ r2 − 1/2 ≤ p2 ≤ r1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ p1 + 1/2 ≤ r2 ≤ p2 + 1/2 ≤ r1 + 1/2 ≤ 1
Despite the analytical complexity of the system of FOCs w.r.t. the stores’ locations, we were
able to identify two distinct equilibrium patterns, and we equally checked that others could
not be obtained (such as complete store and firm agglomeration or complete store and firm
dispersion).
Result 4: A symmetric two-plant duopoly selling substitutable system goods and competing
in quantities on the circular market yields intra-firm agglomeration and inter-firm equidistant
dispersion for all levels of intra-firm complementarity, but also intra-firm diametrical dispersion
and intra-firm agglomeration if the above complementarity is low enough (b < 0.171).
Following the linear case intuition, that firms behave as single-plant entities because of the
internal complementarity, and given Pal’s (1998) result of equidistant dispersion for firms selling
substitutes on the circle, intra-firm agglomeration with equidistant diametrical firm dispersion
is necessarily obtained in equilibrium (cases 1, 2 and 4 yield (0; 0; 12 ;
1
2 )).
However, we are once more able to prove the multiple equilibria property of the circular
14The complete case list and all the computations of this section are contained in the Technical Appendix
available on request.
framework, since case 2, 3 and 4 equally yielded the clustering of rival stores and diametrical
dispersion of aﬃliates (i.e. (0; 12 ;
1
2 ; 1)) as an alternative equilibrium pattern, although viable
only for a low enough complementarity parameter (b < 0.171). In other words, among the four
patterns that possibly satisfy the quantity median property on the circle, only two are obtained
in equilibrium when b < 0.171, whereas neither total dispersion, nor total agglomeration are
equilibria here.
In order to answer the question why aﬃliates can disperse and firms agglomerate when own
products are complements but rival ones are substitutes, we turn to the Best reply functions. For
instance, BR1 = a−c12 −
1
2q3+ bq2+
b
2q4. Note that the only dispersion force is generated by the
direct substitutability between varieties 1 and 3, and that its intensity is constant. That is why,
in both equilibrium patterns obtained, direct subtitutes are always diametrically opposite (see
p∗1 = 0 and r
∗
1 = 1/2). However, when b is very close to 0, the direct and indirect complementarity
eﬀects (such as between 1 and 2 and 1 and 4) are roughly equal, thereby yielding the two
alternative equilibria, exhibiting either intra-firm agglomeration (complementary varieties 1 and
2 share the same location, p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0) or inter-firm agglomeration (complementary varieties 1
and 4 sharing the same location, p∗1 = 0/1 = r
∗
2).
Although both this framework and Yu and Lai’s similarly yield agglomeration between com-
plementary varieties and equidistant dispersion of substitutable ones, it is the diﬀerent ownership
pattern that explains the fact that multiple equilibria obtain in our setting. Indeed, a quick look
at the Best reply function in Yu and Lai’s case - take variety 1 for the sake of an easy comparison
(BR1 = a−c12 − q3 +
b
2q2 +
b
2q4) reveals that the direct intra-firm substitutability is dominant,
so the equilibrium pattern necessarily involves intra-firm dispersion of own aﬃliates. Both the
direct and the indirect complementarity (between 1 and 2 or 1 and 4) weigh equally within the
Best Reply function, but the two possible patterns resulting are basically the same, since they
boil down to rival stores agglomerating (either clustering between 1 and 2, or between 1 and 4).
In contrast, in our setting, once substitutable varieties disperse, the two alternatives left are not
equivalent, since the former involves clustering of strongly complementary products, whereas
the latter involves clustering of weakly complementary rival varieties.
4. Conclusion
Most of the papers on spatial competition with location choice have dealt with homogenous
products, one of the reasons being that the spatial framework naturally yields product diﬀeren-
tiation. Homogeneity is particularly important for Cournot spatial competition, since added to
the strategic substitutability typically generates dispersion. We contribute to the literature by
tackling the location choice of multi-store firms, and allowing each store to deliver a diﬀerent
product, which gives rise to intra-firm complementarity. This assumption was "combined" in
turns with that of complementarity between rival varieties and substitutability between them.
In both settings, we obtain the intuitive outcome of intra-firm agglomeration on both the linear
and circular markets, but also the property of multiple equilibria for the latter. In the Appendix,
we present a table summarizing our results and comparing them with the others results obtained
so far.
To sum up, this paper basically reminds that the shape of the market and assumptions on
plant-level rather than firm-level competition may be essential for determining the equilibrium
pattern in a spatial model with location choice and various types of product diﬀerentiation.
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Appendix
Denote by A1 and A2, and B1 and B2 respectively the locations of aﬃliates belonging to
the same firm.

